Improving benefit cost analysis for Malawi’s farm input subsidy programme, 2006/7 to 2010/11 by Dorward, Andrew & Chirwa, Ephraim
1 
 
IMPROVING BENEFIT COST ANALYSIS FOR MALAWI’S FARM INPUT SUBSIDY 
PROGRAMME, 2006/7 TO 2010/11  
 
 
Andrew Dorward and Ephraim Chirwa 
Working paper, August 2011 
 
 
Summary 
This paper develops improved estimates of benefits and costs of the Malawi Farm Input 
Subsidy from 2005/6 to 2010/11. It sets out principles and purposes for Benefit Cost 
Analysis (BCA) for the programme and applies them to develop a relatively formal partial 
equilibrium methodology for BCA that distinguishes between real income gains to subsidy 
recipients, other producers, and consumers. This allows differential multipliers to be applied 
to these income gains to allow simple analysis of wider equilibrium and dynamic effects of 
the subsidy programme. 
 
Benefit cost analysis faces difficulties due to lack of reliable data on the number of farm 
households in Malawi and on cropping parameters needed for estimation of the 
programmes’ impact on production. Nevertheless the modified benefit cost analysis leads to 
increased estimates of returns to the subsidy programme. The benefit cost ratio averaged 
across 2005/6 to 2010/11 was previously estimated at 1.22, with an average fiscal efficiency 
of 0.31, using moderate assumptions regarding prices and yield responses to fertiliser and 
improved maize seed. Precise estimate of returns to the programme are difficult due to a 
variety of methodological and data quality difficulties, but with the revised methodology the 
average benefit cost ratio is estimated at around 1.6, with fiscal efficiency of around 0.45. 
The analysis provides important pointers to ways in which programme design and 
implementation can be improved to make the programme more effective and efficient. It also 
suggests that with good implementation the programme can provide returns that are 
comparable to and exceed those achievable from alternative and complementary 
investments in infrastructure, education and agricultural research. The programme therefore 
has an important role as a critical element in a strategy of balanced government investments 
promoting poverty reducing growth in Malawi. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
This paper develops benefit:cost estimates for the Malawian Farm Input Subsidy Programme 
(FISP, formerly known as the Agricultural Input Subsidy Programme, AISP). Previous 
estimates of the benefit:cost ratio have not allowed for wider consumer and growth benefits 
(see for example SOAS, 2008; Dorward et al, 2010; Dorward and Chirwa, 2010; Dorward 
and Chirwa, 2011) and this has made it difficult to compare the programme’s returns against 
estimates of returns to other possible investments, such as in roads or agricultural research, 
when these other estimates may include allowance for consumer and growth benefits.  In 
this paper we attempt to address these omissions but give emphasis to methods that have 
relatively simple analytical and data demands (to allow their application in practical policy 
analysis) but nevertheless yield reasonably robust estimates that allow valid comparisons 
with estimates of the costs and benefits to potential alternative investments.  
The paper is structured as follows. After this introduction we first consider the purpose and 
principles for BCA and common methods used in BCA. We then review problems and 
challenges identified with previous Benefit Cost Analysis (BCA) of the FISP. This leads on to 
suggestions for ways of improving FISP benefit/ cost estimates and we discuss the 
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implications of these for estimation of returns to investment over the life of the programme. 
We conclude with a brief discussion of  
• the wider relevance of the estimated benefits from the Malawi FISP,  
• implications for the design and implementation of the FISP, and  
• implications for future data collection and BCA.  
2. Benefit - cost analysis purposes and principles  
Benefit - cost analysis (BCA) of input subsidy programmes has two main functions.   
• It gives an indication of the returns to the programme as compared to returns that 
might be achieved from alternative investments, and thus can guide overall 
government investment and spending decisions. Estimates of such returns are also 
commonly used for more general comparisons of the returns to different types of 
investments (for example between agricultural input subsidies, research, and 
infrastructural development) in order to guide investment choices between 
programmes.  
• It provides information about the variables that are important in determining costs 
and benefits of a specific programme or type of programme, and hence can guide 
programme design and implementation decisions to increase benefits relative to 
costs.  
These two uses of BCA are both important, but they present analysts with something of a 
dilemma. The first requires that common standards are used for BCA across different 
programmes, perhaps in different sectors, to give comparable results across different 
investment alternatives. These standards generally involve standardised methods, but it is 
often difficult to apply such methods across programmes that affect people and the economy 
in different and complex ways and in different policy contexts. These difficulties need to be 
recognised when making comparing comparisons between BCA results obtained for different 
programmes. The second purpose of BCA requires not so much standards for comparable 
estimates of returns, but accurate estimates of the relative importance of different variables 
in affecting these returns in particular investments– and here there may be more value in 
tailoring methods to match specific programme features, and a danger that the results may 
not be comparable with analysis of other investments, but may nevertheless be (wrongly) 
used in this way.  
Taking these two purposes together with an overall objective that BCA should provide 
rigorous, reliable, and objective estimates of benefits and costs, we suggest the following 
seven principles for the choice and implementation of BCA methods (these are not set out 
according to any prioritisation). BCA methods applied in any situation should be 
1. Practicable: They must be applicable with data and analytical resources (skills and 
software for example) that are available (or can reasonably be obtained) 
2. Externally consistent: They must provide measures that are comparable with 
generally accepted good practice in definitions of costs and benefits (for example in 
definitions of financial and economic benefits).  
3. Contextualised: They must take account of particularities that affect the benefits and 
costs of a programme as regards the processes by which costs and benefits are 
linked, the effects of other policies and investments on these, and the conditions 
affecting these. 
4. Holistic: They must take account of all the significant benefits and costs associated 
with a policy or investment programme, both direct benefits and costs to recipients 
and indirect benefits and costs to others.   
5. Internally consistent: They must properly represent the significant relationships 
between investments and behaviours by different stakeholders, taking account of 
‘counterfactuals’ (comparing actual behaviours and outcomes under the programme 
or investments against those that would have occurred in its absence) 
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6. Transparent: Assumptions, measures, data sources, shortcomings and possible bias 
and inaccuracies in methods and their results must be stated and discussed. 
7. Cost effective: BCA methods should be chosen, developed and implemented to 
ensure that costs of analysis are commensurate with or proportional to the value of 
the information provided.  
Cost effectiveness of methods is of course affected by the costs of BCA methods in 
providing information and in the value of the information provided.  
• Costs are determined by resource demands for gathering extra information 
needed and for analysis (as discussed above under practicability and as we 
discuss below as regards demands for different methods).  
• The value of the information provided is determined by its quality and by the 
scope for its use.  
o The determinants of quality are determined by external and internal 
consistency, holism and contextualization (as discussed above) and by 
strengths and weaknesses of analytical methods (which we discuss 
below)  
o Scope for use of information is determined by transparency of results (as 
discussed above),  by the strengths and weaknesses of different methods 
(which we discuss below), and by the potential ‘decision space’  for 
changes in policy choices, design and implementation in the light of new 
information provided by BCA.   
There are particular challenges in applying the first four of the principles above to the 
specific situation in which the FISP operates.   
1. Practicable. There are severe limitations in data availability (for example on crop 
areas and yields, the yield and production effects of subsidised seed and fertiliser, 
and the number of  farm families in the country - see for example Dorward and 
Chirwa, 2010 a and b). There are also limited financial and human resources 
available for analysis, but the determination of the “counterfactual” situation of what 
would have happened without a subsidy is very complex, properly requiring 
consideration of changes throughout the whole economy as a result of changes in 
farm incomes, in food prices, and in the real incomes of consumers. The data and 
resource limitations lead to a fundamental question about the practicability of making 
any reliable estimates without substantial improvements particularly in data 
availability.  
2. Externally consistent. Limited availability of good quality data poses problems for the 
application of good practice in BCA. A further difficulty arises with the long standing 
history of policy interventions inhibiting maize imports and exports, as this makes it 
very difficult to identify true economic prices for maize – conventionally import and 
export parity prices should be used in economic analysis, but one may legitimately 
ask if liberalised market policies are a real policy option for the Malawian 
Government (see for example Tschirley and Jayne, 2010, for a nuanced discussion 
of these issues). If import parity prices are to be used in the analysis then it is very 
difficult to determine what national prices would actually have prevailed with and 
without the subsidy (this adds to the already difficult task of estimating counterfactual 
‘without subsidy’ prices for comparison against the ‘with subsidy’ situation –a ‘double 
counterfactual problem’). 
3. Contextualised.  The effects of the subsidy on livelihoods are complex, widespread 
and in many ways specific to the problems faced by poor Malawian smallholders (see 
for example Dorward and Chirwa, 2011, for discussion of the low maize productivity 
trap and of the policy context). Analysis has to take account of these contextual 
issues – but this may lead to conflict with the two previous principles – requiring more 
complex, non-standard analysis.  
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4. Holistic: The scale and nature of the FISP means that it has widespread, complex 
and varied effects on the livelihoods of different farm households, on consumers, and 
on maize and labour markets (see for example Dorward and Chirwa, 2011). Ideally 
this requires holistic consideration of dynamic and interacting changes in rural 
livelihoods and in rural and national markets. This presents very large data and 
analytical challenges. This is clearly related to the problems of contextualisation, with 
similar potential for conflict with the principles of practicability and external 
consistency – for example can simpler methods be modified to represent key effects 
of wider, complex changes and also generate results that allow meaningful 
comparison with BCA on other investments?  
3. Benefit - cost analysis methods  
Investment and policy analysis methods can be classified according to the extent to which 
they focus on direct, ‘partial equilibrium’ effects of an investment or policy on the 
beneficiaries in the relevant sector as against wider, indirect ‘general equilibrium’ effects on 
beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries across all sectors in an economy. Increasing 
consideration of wider indirect effect increases the analytical complexity and data 
requirements. However although these effects may not be important for smaller scale 
interventions, they may dominate the direct effects for large scale investments in the 
agricultural sector or for significant market policies, if these affect food prices and the 
productivity of large areas of land and large amounts of labour. Where more complex and 
demanding general equilibrium methods are used these should properly represent markets’ 
and different stakeholders’ behaviours and interactions. Where more simple partial 
equilibrium methods are used, then these should where possible build in simple adjustments 
to simulate possible wider economy effects.  
It is helpful to distinguish between 3 basic methodological approaches to BCA for large scale 
policy investments:  
a) Regression models which estimate returns to investments by analysing comparative 
data sets across  different regions in a country, for example, and estimating the 
impacts of investments on welfare measures or economic growth (for example Fan et 
al, 2007), implicitly taking account of multipliers and wider general equilibrium market  
effects. 
b) Computable general equilibrium (CGE) and multi-market models which analyse the 
effects of investments by simulating economic behaviour with and without 
investments – with general equilibrium models simulating economy wide effects, and 
multi-market models examining effects across a more restricted set of markets (for 
example Buffie and Atolia, 2009, describe a CGE analysis of the Malawi FISP – they 
use this to consider the relative benefits of investments in the FISP against 
investments in infrastructure but do not undertake a formal BCA of the FISP) 
c) Partial equilibrium models which examine investment’s welfare impacts on producers 
and consumers (for example Timmer, 1989, for Indonesia). 
These models differ as regards their data demands, the nature of the analytical challenges 
they present, and their ability to allow for market failures, differential effects on different 
types of consumers and producers, linkages and multipliers across markets, and the 
interactions between these. Table 3.1 sets out the broad characteristics of these three types 
of model. 
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Table 3.1 Broad characteristics of three model types  
 
Regression models CGE/ Multimarket 
models 
Partial equilibrium 
models 
Data demands Time series data for 
different relatively 
independent regions: 
investment,  welfare  & 
other variables 
National & multi-sectoral 
data on supply, demand, 
factor ownership, 
productivity & market 
performance. Direct 
productivity impacts of 
investment / policy 
interventions 
Demand (& ideally 
supply) information on 
specific commodity/ies 
of interest.  Direct 
productivity impacts of 
investment / policy 
interventions 
Capacity to describe 
multi-market, indirect 
effects 
Good: intrinsic in  
analysis of broader 
welfare effects 
Good: the key benefit of 
these models, but 
depends on quality of 
model formulation & data 
Weak: no explicit 
consideration, but can 
introduce ad hoc 
adjustments to allow 
for  these effects 
Capacity to describe 
differential market 
failure effects 
Good: should be 
intrinsic in analysis of 
broader welfare effects 
but may not capture 
some spillovers 
Weak: very challenging 
as regards data demands 
& model formulation 
Weak: no explicit 
consideration, but can 
introduce ad hoc 
adjustments to allow 
for  these effects 
Capacity to isolate 
effects of specified 
intervention(s)  
Depends on range of 
conditions in data set – 
difficult if covariant 
changes or if there are 
varying spillovers 
across regions 
Good, depending on 
quality of model 
Can be good, 
depending on context 
& processes 
Strengths Good data sets & 
properly executed 
analysis can give very 
holistic empirical 
analysis 
Multimarket effects, 
counterfactuals 
Relatively simple data 
& methodological 
demands 
Weaknesses Very demanding 
requirements as 
regards historical/ 
empirical data sets –
this can limit breadth of 
application of models; 
assumptions / context 
may not be explicit or 
generalisable; may not 
account for some 
spillover effects 
Complex & demanding; 
proper representation of 
market failures & 
differential behaviour of 
producers & consumers 
very challenging - 
otherwise misleading ; 
assumptions / context 
may not be explicit. 
Does not take account  
of market effects – 
these can only be 
addressed with simple 
relatively ad hoc 
adjustments 
 
It is clear from table 3.1 that the three different approaches have different, and in many ways 
complementary features and strengths and weaknesses. We can conclude from this that  
• In different contexts there will be different choices of method to best follow the 
principles outlined earlier.  
• In all cases analysts must recognise and take account of the limitations of their 
methods and data, and document these to ensure that those using their results are 
able to properly interpret them.  
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• Those using BCA results to compare returns from different investments must take 
great care to ensure that differences in analytical methods, issues and data quality 
are properly allowed for in these comparisons 
• Those using BCA results to guide policy or investment design and implementation 
must also take great care to ensure that strengths and weaknesses in analytical 
methods, issues and data quality are properly allowed for in their considerations.   
• In the particular situation of the Malawi FISP  
o it is impossible to conduct regression analysis as the empirical situations and 
data available do not allow this 
o CGE and multi-market models are very demanding of analytical resources 
and data, and consequently these models may be used for stylized analysis 
of possible effects, but will be too expensive in implementation, too complex 
in application / interpretation, and too reliant on weak data to provide a 
practicable method for regular and detailed year by year analysis 
o The much more limited data and analytical demands of simpler partial 
equilibrium models mean that they are the most practicable (though there are 
still significant challenges here)  
o Major concerns among decision makers within Malawi have been more with 
evolving, relatively detailed design and implementation questions and less 
with relative returns to different investments, but this may change. To date, 
however, the issue of external consistency has therefore been less important 
than in wider regional debates about the relative returns to input subsidies as 
compared with other possible investments.  
 
4. Problems and challenges with Benefit Cost Analysis (BCA) of the FISP  
Evaluations of the 2006/7 and 2008/9 subsidy programmes, and estimates of benefit costs 
ratios for other years, used a standard partial equilibrium methodology for estimating the 
economic benefit cost ratio and fiscal efficiency of the subsidy programme (SOAS et al, 
2008; Dorward and Chirwa, 2009; Dorward et al, 2010; and Dorward and Chirwa 2010).  It 
was recognised, however, that this method did not take account of wider benefits to poor 
consumers, from lower food prices and that paradoxically a lower price of maize provided a 
lower estimate of programme benefit when in fact lower maize prices should lead to wider 
growth and poverty reduction benefits.  
 
SOAS et al (2008), Dorward and Chirwa (2009), Dorward et al (2010) and Dorward and 
Chirwa (2010) consistently identified a number of concerns with use of their results in 
comparing estimated returns from subsidies and other investment. These concerns are also 
relevant to the limited reports of benefit cost and related analysis by others (eg Denning et 
al, 2009; Buffie and Atolia, 2009) and to discussion of these results.  
The concerns may be broadly classified into related problems first with data, second with 
methodology, and third (and sitting behind the methodological problems) are some wider 
theoretical concerns. These problems are of course related, as  
• methodologies embody theory and require, and are limited by, data, and  
• theories require, and are embodied in and limited by, methodologies  
Three major theoretical questions concern 
(a) the measure of benefits,  
(b) extent of benefits and processes of change, and  
(c) the valuation of incremental production. 
The measure of benefits: Ideally benefits should represent welfare changes to recipients and 
non-recipients. This, however, raises questions about the nature of welfare, methods of 
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measurement or estimation, and the relative importance and weighting of welfare changes 
for different stakeholders (for example questions about the relative importance of welfare 
changes in poorer and less poor people, and about the relative importance of welfare 
changes in people now and in the future). Economic theory provides widely used measures 
of welfare changes through the concepts of consumer and producer surplus. There are, 
however, severe methodological and data difficulties in the estimation of supply curves 
needed for the estimation of changes in producer surplus. As a result, changes in real 
income are commonly used as proxy measures of welfare in benefit cost analysis, and 
generally provide similar answers (Sadoulet and de Janvry,1995; Alston, et al, 2000). The 
relatively simple analysis in SOAS et al (2008), Dorward and Chirwa (2009), and Dorward et 
al (2010) provides reasonable estimates of changes in aggregate real income across 
producers and consumers, but no information about the distribution of these benefits 
between producers and consumers or between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. This 
differentiation is important for the use of weights to address distributional questions about 
welfare changes for different types of people.  
The extent of benefits and the processes of change: Dorward and Chirwa (2011) argue that 
subsidy programme benefits can have wide ranging and far reaching dynamic effects where 
they directly overcome financial market failure and investment affordability problems of 
recipients,  address these same problems for poor non-recipients through lower maize prices 
and higher wages, and also provide more conventional multiplier growth effects (where for 
example increases in recipients’ income lead to increases in consumption of locally 
produced goods and services, and hence increases in incomes for local providers of these 
goods and services). Haggblade et al. (2007) suggest agricultural multipliers (excluding 
dynamic effects from overcoming market failures) range from 1.3 to 1.5 in Sub Saharan 
Africa, while Davey and Davis (2008) report estimated multipliers of 2 to 2.45 from 
conditional cash transfers in Dowa (though these fixed price estimates may be reduced by 
30% to allow for supply constraints, to yield estimates of 1.4 to 1.7). Diao et al., (2003) 
estimate a multiplier of 1.5 from increases in grain productivity in Malawi while Benin et al 
(2008) estimate a multiplier of 1.1 from increases in maize productivity in Malawi.  
Dynamic effects and multipliers are implicitly allowed for in BCA using regression analysis 
(for example Fan et al, 2007), and they should be explicitly modelled in general equilibrium 
analysis, although dynamic effects of overcoming market failures are seldom allowed for in 
such models. Multipliers and dynamic effects are not allowed for in partial equilibrium 
methods, and this leads to a bias underestimating returns from partial equilibrium analysis if 
these estimates are compared with results from regression or general equilibrium analyses.  
The valuation of incremental production: The concerns discussed above about the measure 
of benefits and their extent and distribution are concerned with the valuing of incremental 
production, in a very broad sense. Here, however, we discuss two narrower issues, first the 
choice of prices for valuing output and second the discount rate to use.  
As noted earlier, there are legitimate questions about the feasibility of liberalised market 
policies as a real policy option for the Malawian Government, and hence if economic 
analysis should use border or domestic prices. Either way there are then serious 
methodological challenges in determining ‘counterfactual’ prices for a situation without the 
subsidy (with a ‘double counterfactual’ problem if combinations of domestic and border 
prices are to be used).   SOAS et al (2008), Dorward and Chirwa (2009) and Dorward et al 
(2010) used information on border prices with informed judgement to address the ‘double 
counterfactual’ problem to estimate what border prices would have prevailed with and 
without the subsidy in the absence of policies restricting imports.  
No explicit discount rate was used in comparing the benefits and costs of the subsidy. 
However any comparison of the benefit cost ratio from the subsidy with internal rates of 
return estimated for longer term investments involves an implicit assumption that benefits 
are achieved one year after investment. It might, however, be argued that costs are incurred 
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in December to January (when seeds and fertilisers are paid for and applied to the field) but 
benefits are obtained in June (when crops are harvested), giving a return after 6 or 7 
months. It might also be considered, however, that benefits from lower maize prices and 
increased consumption are enjoyed over the period June to May, yielding a return over an 
average of around 12 months. These two alternatives have major implications for estimates 
of internal rates of annual return, as the former has a net Internal Rate of Return (IRR) 70-
80% higher than the net BCR (net benefits divided by costs).   
The discussion above addresses theoretical and related methodological concerns with the 
standard use of partial equilibrium analysis in BCA for the FISP. These concerns are 
exacerbated by and linked to difficulties with the quality and availability of critical data on 
yield responses to subsidised inputs, on overall production data, and on the number of rural 
and farm households.  
5. Improving FISP benefit/ cost estimates 
Consideration of these theoretical, methodological and data difficulties together with the 
earlier discussion of purposes and principles for BCA suggests a number of approaches to 
improving the BCA of the subsidy programme. These involve 
1. Continued use of partial equilibrium analysis, with its relatively limited demands for 
data and analytical resources but formalisation of price estimation used in analysis 
2. Extension of the method to distinguish between producer and consumer gains and, 
among producers, between subsidy recipients and non-recipients 
3. Consideration of  possible dynamic effects of growth and liquidity multipliers   
4. Consideration of results from analysis with alternative estimates of time periods of 
return 
All of these approaches involve elaboration of the estimation of programme benefits: 
estimation of programme costs is not conceptually problematic. Total costs incurred in input 
acquisition (including transport and distribution costs) are added to programme 
administration costs, with application of shadow exchange rates to non-tradable costs in the 
later years of the programme when the Malawi Kwacha is generally considered to have been 
over-valued. Costs of acquisition for subsidised inputs that displace unsubsidized inputs are 
subtracted from the programme costs, as these provide no incremental benefits and are 
simply a transfer from government to the recipients of those subsidised inputs. They 
therefore have little effect on the benefit: cost ratio of the programme, as they are excluded 
from both benefits and costs (they do, however, affect the Net Present Value (NPV) of the 
programme, and hence its fiscal efficiency, NPV/ fiscal costs). 
5.1. Methodology for formal estimation of prices and producer and consumer gains 
To improve our estimates of programme benefits, we begin by formalising price estimation, 
focusing on the effects of the subsidy programme on maize production1. Figure 5.1 shows 
how for an autarkic economy2 a production subsidy causes a downward shift in the market 
price supply curve (S to S*) and this leads to an expansion in supply (from Q to Q*) and a fall 
in consumer price for the product (from P to P*).   
                                                      
1
  2006/7, 2008/9 and 2010/11 household surveys reported in SOAS (2008), Dorward et al. 
(2010) and Dorward and Chirwa (2011) show that almost all the incremental fertiliser use as 
a result of the subsidy programme was applied to maize and there is no evidence of shifts in 
cropping patterns in 2008/9 as a result of the subsidy programme (Holden and Lunduka 
(2010) also find no evidence of shifts in cropping patterns, although Chibwana et al (2010) 
suggest some shifting into maize by subsidy recipients.)  
2
 The assumption of autarky is a reasonable analytical starting point for the Malawi maize 
market, given the high transport costs in exporting to or importing from the world market. We 
consider later the effects informal imports from surrounding countries (notably 
Mozambique), actual or potential price ceilings from potential imports from South Africa,   
and exports to Zimbabwe in 2007/8.  
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Figure 5.1 Input subsidy impacts on output supply and price 
(adapted from Dorward, 2009) 
 
The change in real income for producers is analysed in terms of the effects of changes in 
output prices, costs, and volumes produced and sold.  
Change in producer income  ∆ =  ∗ −   
 ∆ = 	
∗ + ∗ − 	∗ − ∆
∗ − ∗ − ∆ − 	 −             (1) 
 ∆ = 
∗ − 	∗ − 	 − 	∗ − ∆
∗ − ∗ −  − ∆              (2) 
           where   ∗ = producers’ income after subsidy 
  = producers’ income before subsidy 
 Q* = production after subsidy 
 Q = production before subsidy 
 P* = output price after subsidy 
 P = output price before subsidy 
 ∆= increase in production from use of subsidised inputs 
  = producers’ average unit costs for output before / without subsidy 
 ∗ = producers’ unit costs for extra output (ie excluding subsidised costs)  
The change in producers’ income therefore consists of changes in sales value less the costs 
of production with the subsidy plus the savings on unsubsidized production where this has 
been displaced by subsidised production. The change in sales value is made up of a loss 
due to the fall in product price for the original amount produced (area abdf in figure 5.1), but 
a gain from extra production at the lower price (area dchg in figure 5.1)3. With totally elastic 
                                                      
3
  In the long run the loss of producer incomes from falls in unsubsidised maize production and 
in prices may be smaller than estimated here as rising real incomes for consumers will raise 
S S*
D
P*
P
Q Q*
Produce 
price ($)
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a b
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g h
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demand there would be no price loss and all the subsidised production would be extra 
production, hence under these circumstances  ∆ = ∗ − 	∗ − ∆∗.  With totally 
inelastic demand there would be no increase in production and all the subsidised production 
would displace unsubsidized production, hence ∆ = −	 − 	∗ + ∆ − ∗. Under 
these circumstances ∆ = 0 and hence 	 − 	∗ =  ∆ − ∗.. 
The change in real income for consumers consists of the savings on existing purchases due 
to the price fall (abdf in figure 5.1) plus the savings in extra purchases which are best valued 
in terms of savings on previous expenditures (area bcd in figure 5.1). 
 Change in consumer real income = ∆ =  	 − 	∗ +


	 − 	∗∗ −          (3) 
Total change in producers’ and consumers’ real income can be estimated by the sum of 
changes in producer and consumer incomes: 
  ∆ =  
∗ − 	∗ − ∆
∗ − ∗ −  − ∆ +


	 − 	∗∗ −            (4) 
The method for estimating overall benefits in equation 4 is broadly that used in evaluations 
of the AISP (SOAS et al, 2008; Dorward et al, 2010). These used analysts’ informal 
judgement of ‘double counterfactual’ prices with and without the subsidy respectively to 
estimate P* and P in the absence of government bans on formal imports.  
P can, however, be estimated using formal estimates of price elasticity of demand (ED), 
together with information on prices and production with the subsidy. 	 − 	∗ can then be 
substituted as follows: 
 
	 − 	∗ =  


∗
∗
∗ −          (5) 
We can then substitute for 	 − 	∗ into equations 2, 3 and 4 as follows: 
Change in producer real income   
 ∆ = 
∗ − 	∗ − 


∗
∗
∗ −  − ∆
∗ − ∗ −  − ∆               (6) 
Change in consumer real income = ∆ =  


∗
∗
∗ −  +


∗ −              (7) 
Change in producer and consumer real income 
 ∆ =  
∗ − 	∗ − ∆
∗ − ∗ −  − ∆ +


∗
∗
∗ −                (8) 
Equations 6 to 8 still present problems in that we require an estimate of ∗ − . However, 
the seasonal separation of supply and demand means that if we can initially ignore farmers’ 
expectations of lower prices in the following season then incremental production will be 
equal to the increase in production from use of subsidised inputs, so that ∗ −  = ∆.4 
Introducing this into equations 6 to 8 gives the following estimates of changes in real income: 
Change in producer real income   
 ∆ = ∆	
∗ − ∗ − 


∗
∗
∆                   (9) 
Change in consumer real income = ∆ =  


∗
∗
∆ +


∆                       (10) 
Change in producer and consumer real income     
                                                                                                                                                                     
prices for non-maize and non-farm goods and services, which can replace their lost and/or 
lower value maize production  
4
  As noted above, this is the approach that was used in evaluations of the AISP (SOAS et al, 
2008; Dorward et al, 2010) 
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 ∆ =  ∆	
∗ − ∗ +


∗
∗
∆

                   (11) 
All of the analysis in this section has been derived from our initial consideration of a closed 
economy (Figure 5.1). It does, however, also apply for a small open economy with a wide 
band between import and export parity prices. Thus if increased production causes an 
economy to eliminate imports of QM so that the price falls to P*, below import parity PM, then 
this can be handled by estimating gains in consumer and producer real incomes allowing for 
these prices.5  
In these circumstances then assuming that ∗ −  = ∆ as above then 
 ∆ = ∆	
∗ −  − 	 − 	
∗ − ∆
∗
     (12) 
 ∆ =  	 − 	
∗ +


	 − 	
∗∆ −       (13) 
and  ∆ =  ∆	∗ + 	 − 	∗ − ∆∗ +


	 − 	
∗∆ −    (14) 
Use of equations 9 to 11 or 12 to 14 depends on the relative values of PM  and P: equations 
9 to 11 are used if PM  > P, and  equations 12 to 14 are used if PM  < P, where P is estimated 
from equation 5. If, in addition, PM < P* then PM  replaces P* in equations 12 to 14, and there 
are no consumer benefits or producer losses from price changes. The equations above can 
also be adjusted to allow for exports if P* is below the export parity price PX. In this case PX 
replaces P* in equations 12 to 13 if the subsidy would move domestic prices from above 
import parity to below export parity prices, or in equations 2 to 3  (with replacement of 
∗ −   by  ∆) if the subsidy would move below domestic prices which are already 
import parity to below export parity. 
The methodology developed in this sub- section demonstrates the basic validity of the BCA 
approach used in SOAS et al, 2008 and Dorward et al, 2010, but also allows a breakdown 
between producer and consumer benefits with more formal estimates of P and Q* if 
estimates of ∆ and of price elasticity of demand (ED) are available.  
5.2. Estimation of price and quantity demand relations and of incremental production 
We now develop estimates of overall returns to the subsidy and of separate producer and 
consumer benefits using the methodology developed above. First, however, estimates are 
needed of price elasticity of demand (ED) and of ∆. These estimates are unfortunately not 
without their own difficulties.  
We first consider the estimation of price elasticity of demand (ED) or (more generally) of the 
relationship between price and quantity demanded. Figure 5.2 shows maize price (average 
annual prices from MoAFS market surveys) against estimated quantity consumed per capita 
over the period where quantity consumed per capita is calculated from Ministry of Agriculture 
and Food Security crop production estimates, census data, and exports and import 
estimates compiled from various sources. 
                                                      
5
 Note that where producers outside an economy export into that economy but at prices 
largely determined within the economy (as is broadly the case with Mozambiquan exports to 
Malawi) then the loss of producer income suffered by these producers due to the price fall is 
not a loss to the domestic producers and the domestic economy. 
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Figure 5.2 Maize prices and estimated quantity consumed per capita from 1993/94 to 
2009/10 production seasons 
(adapted from Dorward and Chirwa, 2011) 
 
Dorward and Chirwa (2011) discuss the possible causes for the apparent discrepancy 
between the 1993/4 to 2005/6 and 2006/7 to 2009/10 series: increasing storage losses, 
increasing on-farm storage and thinner markets in the later years, inconsistency in 
production estimates (possibly inflated in later years), and higher nominal wages in later 
years with falls in real maize prices relative to income not captured in these years. The last 
point raises wider questions regarding appropriate maize prices to use in real income 
calculations6. If the latter two explanations are the two main causes, and if production 
estimates from 1993/4 to 2005/6 are broadly correct, then this suggests that the 1993/4 to 
2005/6 data should provide a reasonable estimate of price elasticity of demand with constant 
wages – but that there will be a shift in demand where wages rise.  
Three regression models were estimated of log quantity on log price quantity from maize 
price data and supply estimates from 1993/94. The first is derived from data from the 1993/4 
to 2009/10 seasons with the inclusion of a dummy variable for subsidy effects from 2005/6 
onwards and of a time variable to allow for changing base per capita demand over time. This 
gave an estimate of price elasticity of demand of -0.24 (n=17, t= 1.5, R2=0.56).Given 
concerns about the reliability of data from 2006/7 to 2009/10 as discussed above and 
implausibly high estimates of ‘without subsidy’ prices when subsequently applying this 
model, it was rejected.  The second model regressed log quantity on log price quantity from 
the 1993/4 to 2005/6 seasons7 and gives an estimate of price elasticity of demand of -0.38 
(n=13, t= 1.9, R2=0.24). The third used the same data set with the inclusion of a time 
variable to allow for changing base per capita demand over time, and gives  an estimate of 
price elasticity of demand of -0.51 (n=13, t=2.2, R2=0.33). The third model was preferred as 
                                                      
6
  Dorward (2011) provides a wider discussion of the benefits of indexing food prices against 
income.  
7
  Restriction of the data series to the 1993/4 to 2005/6 seasons (a) provides more 
consistent estimates than are obtained from the 1993/94 to 2009/10 series and (b) 
standardises for the effects of possible inconsistency in production estimates and of higher 
nominal wages in later years. 
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regards its better fit and inclusion of a time effect, and was therefore used in the analysis 
that is reported below and is shown in figure 5.2.  
Having considered the estimation of the relationship between price and quantity demanded 
and hence of price elasticity of demand (ED), we now consider the estimation of ∆ , 
incremental production from the subsidy programme. The difficulties with obtaining reliable 
and precise estimates of ∆ are discussed extensively in Dorward and Chirwa (2010). 
Previous estimates of the benefit:cost ratio in SOAS (2008), Dorward and Chirwa (2010) and 
Dorward and Chirwa (2011) have therefore estimated incremental production assuming that 
every kg nitrogen (N) in incremental fertiliser application leads to 12 kg incremental grain 
production when applied on local maize and to 18kg  incremental grain production when 
applied on hybrid maize8. This approach was followed here, with incremental fertiliser 
application as a result of the subsidy programme estimated from 2006/7, 2008/9  and 
2010/11 survey estimates of displacement of unsubsidised fertiliser sales by subsidised 
fertiliser sales.  
5.3. Formal estimation of prices and producer and consumer gains 
Using these estimates of the relationship between price and quantity available and of the 
incremental production from the subsidy we can now estimate changes in overall incomes 
from equations 11 and 14 over a range of assumptions, as shown in table 5.1 for the years 
2005/6 to 2010/119.  
Table 5.1 presents for each year the border adjusted prices estimated in one row with the 
demand elasticity discussed earlier (and shown in figure 5.2) and, in another row, using 
analysts’ judgements. Different columns then show estimates of net benefits, benefit cost 
ratios (BCRs) and fiscal efficiencies (FEs) without any growth multipliers. 
The main point of interest in table 5.1 is the differences between results obtained with prices 
estimated using demand elasticity calculations  and those obtained with analysts’ 
judgements10: estimated returns are generally higher with prices estimated using demand 
elasticity calculations than with those obtained from analysts’ judgements.  This arises partly 
from lower prices in analysts’ estimates, particularly in the earlier years, due to more weight 
being given to the possibility of substantially lower price imports from Mozambique in 2005/6 
and 2006/7 (to a lesser extent) in 2007/8 and 2009/10.11  
 
 
  
                                                      
8
  See SOAS (2008) for summary of a range of different studies from which these estimates 
were derived 
9
  Elasticities of demand per se. were not used in these calculations, due to averaging 
problems over price and quantity ranges, instead the estimated equations were used to 
calculate price and quantity changes. Preliminary estimates for 2010/11 pending further 
information on seasonal maize prices and on displacement estimates. 
10
  Differences in results across different years are due to variation in maize prices (with high 
domestic prices from 2007/8 requiring analysis using import parity prices for the without 
subsidy situation – and even for the with subsidy situation in 2007/8), and in fertiliser 
prices (which rose steadily from 2005/6 to a peak in 2008/9) - as discussed for example in 
Dorward and Chirwa (2011),.  
11
  Where without subsidy domestic prices would be higher than import parity, the formal price 
estimation also allows for part of the subsidised production to substitute for imports (so 
that consumer benefits are not derived from a simple average of import parity and the with 
subsidy domestic price). 
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Table 5.1 Base Benefit Cost Analysis 2005/6 to 2010/11 
Year  ED   
P P* PM PX 
BENEFITS 
Net 
benefit, 
US$ mill 
BCR FE 
US$/kg 
2005/6 0.51 0.24 0.14 0.29 0.14 42.2 1.58 1.16 
 
Original mean= 0.14 N/A N/A 8.7 1.12 0.24 
2006/7  0.51 0.25 0.13 0.32 0.17 47.1 1.48 0.64 
 
Original mean= 0.15 N/A N/A 6.0 1.06 0.08 
2007/8 0.51 1.83 0.35 0.30 0.15 113.1 1.86 1.19 
 
Original mean= 0.25 N/A N/A 69.5 1.53 0.73 
2008/9 0.51 1.27 0.26 0.28 0.13 -39.0 0.87 -0.16 
 
Original mean= 0.28 N/A N/A -40.2 0.87 -0.16 
2009/10 0.51 0.67 0.22 0.28 0.13 47.9 1.27 0.34 
 
Original mean= 0.26 N/A N/A 35.4 1.20 0.25 
2010/11 0.51 0.86 0.19 0.35 0.20 144.3 1.76 0.99 
 
Original mean= 0.27 N/A   95.7 1.50 0.66 
Notes:  ED, P, P* PM and PX represent respectively demand elasticities, without and with subsidy 
maize prices (in current US$), and import and export parity maize prices (calculated from 
SAFEX prices with import and export transport costs of $100/MT and $50/MT respectively). 
BCR (Benefit Cost Ratio) is calculated as total economic benefit divided by total economic 
costs; FE (Fiscal Efficiency) as net benefit (total economic benefit less total economic costs) 
divided by total fiscal costs. Under ED, ‘AE’ stands for Analyst Estimates as used reported in 
earlier evaluations and Dorward and Chirwa (2011). ‘n.a.’ indicates ‘not applicable’. 
We now use equations 9, 10, 12 and 13 to estimate producers’ and consumers’ relative 
gains.  
Table 5.2 Consumer and producer benefits  
Year  ED  
FISCAL 
COSTS  
ECONOMIC COSTS BENEFITS 
Gov't 
etc 
Recipients Total Producers Consumers Total 
 
  Recipients Others 
 
  
US$ mill 
2005/6  0.51 36.4 28.4 44.4 72.8 77.8 -167.1 204.4 115.0 
  Original 36.4 28.4 44.4 72.8 N/A N/A N/A 81.5 
2006/7  0.51 73.9 53.1 44.6 97.7 111.3 -139.5 173.1 144.8 
  Original 73.9 53.1 44.6 97.7 N/A N/A N/A 103.7 
2007/8  0.51 95.4 82.1 50.0 132.1 245.2 0.0 0.0 245.2 
  Original 95.4 82.1 50.0 132.1 N/A N/A N/A 201.6 
2008/9 0.51 248.2 224.1 78.4 302.5 240.5 -16.8 39.8 263.5 
  Original 248.2 224.1 78.4 302.5 N/A N/A N/A 262.2 
2009/10 0.51 140.3 122.5 53.0 175.5 175.0 -70.0 118.3 223.3 
  Original 140.3 122.5 53.0 175.5 N/A N/A N/A 210.9 
2010/11 0.51 145.3 134.2 56.0 190.2 213.2 -134.8 256.1 334.5 
  Original 145.3 134.2 56.0 190.2 N/A N/A N/A 285.9 
Notes:  ED represents demand elasticities. Economic costs exclude costs of displaced fertilisers. 
Prod’n (Production) gains accrue to recipients. Data as from earlier evaluations, Dorward and 
Chirwa (2011) and table 5.1.  
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5.4. Effects of growth and liquidity multipliers   
There is no particular methodology for building of growth and liquidity multipliers into partial 
equilibrium analysis, but the estimated economic benefits and costs from partial equilibrium 
analysis can simply be multiplied by relevant estimates of agricultural multipliers.  As 
discussed earlier, a number of studies estimate agricultural multipliers of around 1.4 in Sub 
Saharan Africa and Malawi. We therefore initially introduce multipliers by multiplying farm 
benefits and costs by 1.4. It is also important to allow for possible multiplier effects of 
alternative use of resources invested in the programme. We use a multiplier of 1.2 for 
alternative investments (the lower number to allow for the high multiplier effects of increases 
in income to poor rural people), and multiply non-farm costs by this. Table 5.3 shows the 
results of this analysis together with results without the use of multipliers (also shown earlier 
in table 5.2).  
 
Table 5.3  Benefit Cost Analysis without and with growth multipliers 
Year ED  
BASE Growth Multiplier 
Net benefit BCR FE Net benefit BCR FE 
US$ mill     US$ mill     
2005/6  0.51 42.2 1.6 1.2 59.1 1.7 1.6 
  Original 8.7 1.1 0.2 12.2 1.2 0.3 
2006/7  0.51 47.1 1.5 0.6 76.6 1.6 1.0 
  Original 6.0 1.1 0.1 9.4 1.2 0.1 
2007/8  0.51 113.1 1.9 1.2 174.7 2.0 1.8 
  Original 69.5 1.5 0.7 107.4 1.7 1.1 
2008/9  0.51 -39.0 0.9 -0.2 -9.7 1.0 0.0 
  Original -40.2 0.9 -0.2 -9.8 1.0 0.0 
2009/10  0.51 47.9 1.3 0.3 91.5 1.4 0.7 
  Original 35.4 1.2 0.3 67.2 1.3 0.5 
2010/11  0.51 144.3 1.8 1.0 228.9 2.0 1.6 
  Original 95.7 1.5 0.7 150.0 1.7 1.0 
Notes:  ED represents demand elasticities. BCR (Benefit Cost Ratio) is calculated as total economic 
benefit divided by total economic costs. FE (Fiscal Efficiency) is calculated as net benefit 
(total economic benefit less total economic costs)  divided by total fiscal costs. Under ED, ‘AE’ 
stands for Analyst Estimates as used in BCA reported in earlier evaluations and Dorward and 
Chirwa (2011). Economic costs exclude costs of displaced fertilisers. Data from earlier 
evaluations, Dorward and Chirwa (2011) and table 5.1.  
 
The table shows substantially improved BCA results with allowance for the effects of 
multipliers. This is also shown in table 5.4, which compares results using three different sets 
of multipliers. The first of these is identical to that shown in table 5.3, the second two are 
calculated with different multipliers for different types of people, distinguishing between 
consumers (who are dominated by poor rural people), producers (where less poor rural 
people dominate in production for sale – SOAS et al, 2008) and subsidy recipients. For the 
latter, results are compared with two different multiplier values, the first with a lower value 
reflecting a bias in subsidy distribution to the less poor (as observed in 2006/7 (SOAS, 
2008)), the second with a higher value to investigate possible effects of more effective 
targeting of subsidised inputs to poorer households.  
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Table 5.4  Benefit Cost Analysis with different growth multipliers 
  
Simple growth 
multiplier = 1.4 
Differentiated: Consumers= 1.4; Producers = 1.2  
  
Recipients = 1.1 Recipients = 1.4 
  
Net benefit BCR FE Net benefit BCR FE Net benefit BCR FE 
Year ED  US$ mill     US$ mill     US$ mill     
2005/6  0.51 59.1 1.7 1.6 88.0 2.1 2.4 98.0 2.0 2.7 
  Original 12.2 1.2 0.3 18.0 1.5 0.5 19.3 1.5 0.5 
2006/7  0.51 76.6 1.6 1.0 53.5 1.5 0.7 65.0 1.5 0.9 
  Original 9.4 1.2 0.1 7.9 1.1 0.1 8.8 1.1 0.1 
2007/8  0.51 174.7 2.0 1.8 116.2 1.8 1.2 174.7 2.0 1.8 
  Original 107.4 1.7 1.1 71.4 1.4 0.7 107.4 1.7 1.1 
2008/9  0.51 -9.7 1.0 0.0 -55.0 0.8 -0.2 -6.4 1.0 0.0 
  Original -9.8 1.0 0.0 -55.4 0.8 -0.2 -4.8 1.0 0.0 
2009/10 0.51 91.5 1.4 0.7 68.9 1.3 0.5 105.5 1.5 0.8 
  Original 67.2 1.3 0.5 53.6 1.3 0.4 79.4 1.4 0.6 
2010/11 0.51 228.9 2.0 1.6 198.6 1.9 1.4 251.6 2.0 1.7 
  Original 150.0 1.7 1.0 137.1 1.7 0.9 168.9 1.8 1.2 
 
 Notes:  See notes for table 5.3. ‘Differentiated’ results with different growth multipliers for benefits and 
costs for different categories of people as shown. Multiplier of 1.2 for government costs 
throughout.  
Lower multipliers for less poor people and higher multipliers for poorer people reflect a 
general pattern observed in growth multipliers, and may also result from dynamic benefits 
from subsidy receipt and lower prices and higher real incomes relaxing seasonal finance 
constraints.   
Two broad observations can be made from the results presented in Tables 5.3 and 5.4. First, 
both tables show that estimates of net benefits, benefit cost ratios and fiscal efficiencies 
generally increase when the effects of multipliers are allowed for, and these increases can 
be substantial. Second, Table 5.4 shows that if different types of household have different 
growth multipliers then this can affect returns to investment. Since poorer households 
generally have higher multipliers and account for a higher share of consumption than they do 
of production, subsidies that lead to domestic price falls will, other things being equal,  
generally lead to higher returns. Similarly, greater targeting of the poor as subsidy recipients 
will also generally raise returns.  
 
5.5. Effects of alternative estimates of time periods of return  
It was noted earlier that the use of benefit cost ratios implies an annual return on investment. 
However, it might be argued that returns are achieved over a shorter period, for example 7 
months from fertiliser purchase and application to harvest. Table 5.5 shows the effects of 
shorter returns on annual rates of return for different BCRs.  
  
17 
 
Table 5.5  Annual Rates of Return for benefit cost ratios achieved over different 
periods  
 
 
Annual Internal Rate of Return 
Months 7 8 9 10 11 12 
BCR 
      1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
1.05 1.09 1.08 1.07 1.06 1.05 1.05 
1.10 1.18 1.15 1.14 1.12 1.11 1.10 
1.15 1.27 1.23 1.20 1.18 1.16 1.15 
1.20 1.37 1.31 1.28 1.24 1.22 1.20 
1.25 1.47 1.40 1.35 1.31 1.28 1.25 
1.30 1.57 1.48 1.42 1.37 1.33 1.30 
 
As table 5.5 shows, if returns are achieved over shorter periods than a year then this can 
lead to substantial increases of the annual rate of return above the BCR – and these 
increases are larger for higher BCRs over shorter periods.  
 
5.6. Sensitivity of BCA estimates to higher and lower yields and higher displacement  
In this subsection we consider how for a given initial ‘without subsidy’ situation, changes in 
actual yield and displacement affect returns to investment. Annex table A provides 
information on estimates for the different scenarios.  
Higher yields lead to higher returns from increased volumes of incremental production, but 
they also tend to lead to lower prices – increasing returns to consumers and losses to 
producers. This becomes important where differential multipliers are used. Where prices are 
very high and remain above import parity price then this does not occur, and its effect is also 
reduced where prices fall to the export parity price. 
Increased displacement reduces incremental production, with opposite effects to those 
discussed above with increasing yields. Reduced returns are, however, counteracted to 
some extent by reduced costs, and this means that the BCR falls less than the Fiscal 
Efficiency (indeed if costs fall by a smaller proportion than benefits then the BCR may rise 
slightly while the FE falls significantly,).  
6. Conclusions 
We conclude with a brief review of the findings in this paper and discussion of their wider 
relevance to considerations of the economic viability of the Malawi FISP (and other subsidy 
programmes),  and of their implications for the design and implementation of the FISP, and 
for future data collection and Benefit Cost Analysis.  
6.1. Review of findings  
In this paper we have considered purposes, principles and alternative methodologies for 
benefit cost analysis against particular theoretical, methodological and data challenges faced 
in BCA of the FISP. In light of this, we have put forward a formal methodology for improving 
the estimation of producer and consumer gains and losses and used this to provide 
alternative estimates of the programmes’ annual net benefit, benefit cost ratio and fiscal 
efficiency from 2005/6 to 2009/10. The effects of multipliers (from growth linkages and 
liquidity benefits for poor households) and allowing for returns over a shorter investment 
18 
 
period were also investigated. The results (using a simple average over the five years) are 
summarised in table 6.1.  
 
Table 6. 1 Alternative estimates of returns to FISP investments, 2005/6 to 2009/10 
   
Annual return 
Annualised 
return 
  
ED NB BCR FE BCR 
 
Basic estimate 
0.51 60.38 1.48 0.70 1.59 
 
Original 30.01 1.22 0.31 1.27 
 
Simple multiplier 
0.51 106.04 1.62 1.15 1.78 
 
Original 57.41 1.34 0.52 1.42 
 
Differentiated (a) 
0.51 79.59 1.57 1.01 1.71 
 
Original 39.72 1.32 0.42 1.39 
 
Differentiated (b) 
0.51 114.74 1.68 1.31 1.86 
 Original 63.16 1.40 0.58 1.50 
 See notes on earlier tables. Averages are simple (unweighted) averages. 
Annualised return if BCR is achieved over 10 months.  
 
Considering the different estimates for the base scenario (that is with estimated 
displacement for each year and incremental fertiliser yielding 18kg grain per kg N on hybrid 
maize and 12kg grain per kg N on local maize) there are a range of different estimates for 
different years. Without consideration of any growth multipliers, the estimated average BCR 
of the six years of the subsidy programme ranges from 1.21 (the estimates using analysts’ 
estimates of prices) to 1.47 (with formal estimation of demand and an elasticity of demand of 
0.51). Adding in multipliers raises the estimated BCRs to 1.32 to 1.4 using analysts’ price 
estimates and 1.56 to 1.68 with formal demand estimation. Further allowance for returns 
over less than 12 months gives a range of the annual rate of return from 1.39 to 1.86, with 
multipliers. These are high estimated returns and support caveats in SOAS (2008), Dorward 
et al. (2010) and Dorward and Chirwa (2011) that their reported returns (using analysts’ 
estimates of prices) were downwardly biased by exclusion of important effects of growth 
multipliers.  
Making a precise estimate of the BCR remains difficult, for reasons that are clear from this 
paper, but leaving aside the possibility of achieving returns in less than a year, and taking 
the formal estimation as more reliable suggests that the average BCR is likely to be around 
1.6 after allowing for the effects of multipliers, with fiscal efficiency of around 0.45. This is 
sensitive to yield responses (and hence both programme implementation and weather), and 
international maize prices. The latter have been higher in recent years, and are likely to 
remain high, and there is considerable potential for higher yield responses than those 
assumed here. Higher displacement would not affect the BCR very much but would lower 
fiscal efficiency.    
6.2. Economic viability of the Malawi FISP  
Overall these returns are high and suggest that the FISP provides a good return on 
investment– with scope for improved efficiency and effectiveness to make returns much 
higher in the future. However there are, of course, also risks of poor implementation, 
unfavourable weather and changes in prices that depress returns (see section 6.3 below and 
Dorward and Chirwa, 2011). 
The extent to which the FISP represents the best use of investment funds depends upon 
competition for funds between different investments and their relative returns. Buffie and 
Atolia (2009) find, using CGE analysis, the net benefits of the FISP depend critically upon 
19 
 
the relative returns to fertiliser use and to investments in roads, and upon the extent to which 
investment in FISP crowds out investments in infrastructure. They conclude that a strategy 
of mixed investments is probably best. Fan et al (2007) report that investments in education, 
roads, agricultural research and development, credit subsidies, and input subsidies (in that 
order) all yielded high returns in such a mixed investment strategy in the early stages of the 
green revolution in India12.    
There is very limited specific information on returns to alternative investments such as in 
roads and in agricultural research and development in Malawi, and it is common to rely on 
estimates from other African countries or from Asia. These tend to show very high returns to 
these investments. Buffie and Atolia (2009) use returns to infrastructure investment of 
between 10 and 30% (a BCR of 1.1 to 1.3), citing evidence from Fan et al (2003) and Pohl 
and Mihaljek (1992). Alston et al (2000) report a modal rate of return of 43% to agricultural 
research from a meta analysis of studies but report very wide ranges in estimates with some 
possible biases indicated by lower estimates in peer reviewed and ex ante (as opposed to ex 
post) studies and in studies in LDCs. Estimated returns from the FISP are comparable with 
these estimates. 
6.3. Implications for FISP design and implementation  
The formal price analysis and introduction of multipliers in the BCA in this paper reinforces 
and adds to previous studies’ discussions of the lessons from BCA for FISP design and 
implementation (SOAS, 2008; Dorward and Chirwa, 2009; Dorward et al., 2010): returns will 
be improved by measures that increase yield responses to fertiliser (for example earlier input 
delivery, greater emphasis on integrated soil fertility management, improved application, 
more cost effective formulations, more technical advice, more targeting to the poor) and that 
reduce displacement (for example better regional and household targeting, better control of 
diversion and fraud, earlier registration and input delivery). The inclusion of multipliers in the 
BCA strengthens the importance of all of these issues, as gains from improved efficiency 
and effectiveness are multiplied. It also adds further weight to the importance of targeting, of 
ensuring that maize marketing policies allow increased maize production to lower maize 
prices (as benefits to poorer subsidy recipients and consumers tend to have higher 
multipliers) and suggests that to maximize linkages and reduce leakages (Dorward et al, 
2003)  there should be complementary investments in measures facilitating the growth of the 
non-farm economy and of non-staple agriculture (for example horticulture, legumes and 
livestock) in response to subsidy-led growth real in real incomes.  
6.4. Implications for future data collection and Benefit Cost Analysis  
The partial equilibrium methods developed in this paper have sought to follow and find 
appropriate compromises between the six principles set out in section 2, being practicable, 
externally consistent, contextualised, holistic, internally consistent, transparent, and cost 
effective. The method is relatively simple in terms of its data needs and the calculations 
required but nevertheless it takes account of the context and complex processes affecting 
FISP returns, and it also addresses the key questions that policy makers and technicians 
ask (regarding both FISP’s overall returns – for comparison with other investments - and the 
critical variables that determine its effectiveness and efficiency). It could be improved by 
further research leading to better estimates of maize price determinants and of growth 
multipliers.  
                                                      
12
  Buffie and Atolia do not model the effects of the FISP on overcoming poor recipients’ and 
consumers’ liquidity constraints. Rationing of large unit subsidies in the FISP should make 
it more efficient than India’s universal subsidies, and its impact on liquidity constraints in 
the absence of a credit programme should mean that it generates some of the benefits 
that Fan et al report for credit subsidies in India. Fan et al’s estimates of returns to 
subsidies relative to roads may be under-estimated to some extent as a result of higher 
cross region spill-over effects from subsidies, not captured in the model. 
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Its application does, however, highlight the need for good data on the yield and production 
effects of subsidised inputs. This is a major challenge. Malawi has excellent data on market 
prices, and the biennial AISP/ FISP evaluation surveys have provided valuable information 
on targeting and use of subsidised inputs. However there are continuing difficulties with data 
on the total number of farm households, on cropping areas and yields, and on yield 
responses to inputs and agronomic management (Dorward et al, 2010; Dorward and Chirwa, 
2010). Improved data on these variables is critical not just for the evaluation of the FISP, but 
for much wider policy development, monitoring and evaluation.   
 
 
 
Abbreviations and acronyms 
 
AISP  Agricultural Input Subsidy Programme 
BCA  Benefit cost analysis 
BCR  Benefit cost ratio 
FE  Fiscal efficiency 
FISP  Farm Input Subsidy Programme 
IRR  Internal rate of return 
MoAFS Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security 
NB  Net  benefit 
NPV  Net  present value 
NSO  National Statistical Office 
 
 
References 
Alston, J. M., C. Chan-Kang, et al. (2000). A Meta-Analysis of Rates of Return to Agricultural 
R&D: Ex Pede Herculem? Research report 113. Washington D.C., International Food 
Policy Research Institute. 
Benin, S., J. Thurlow, et al. (2008). Agricultural Growth and Investment Options for Poverty 
Reduction in Malawi. IFPRI Discussion Paper 00794. Washington DC, IFPRI. 
Buffie, E. F. and M. Atolia (2009). Agricultural input subsidies in Malawi: good, bad or hard to 
tell? FAO Commodity and Trade Policy Research Working Paper 28. Rome, FAO. 
Chibwana, C., M. Fisher, et al. (2010). Measuring the Impacts of Malawi’s Farm Input 
Subsidy Program. Draft for discussion at BASIS AMA CRSP TC meeting. 
Chibwana, C., M. Fisher, et al. (2010). Land Allocation Effects of Agricultural Input Subsidies 
in Malawi. Mimeo. 
Chirwa, E., M. Matita, et al. (2011). Impacts of the Farm Input Subsidy Programme in 
Malawi. School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, Future 
Agricultures Consortium. 
Chirwa, E., A. R. Dorward, et al. (2011). Conceptualising Graduation from Agricultural Input 
Subsidies in Malawi. Brighton, Sussex, Future Agricultures Consortium 
Davies, S. and J. Davey (2008). A Regional Multiplier Approach to Estimating the Impact of 
Cash Transfers on the Market: The Case of Cash Transfers in Rural Malawi. 
Development Policy Review 26(1): 91-111. 
Denning, G., P. Kabambe, et al. (2009). Input Subsidies to Improve SmallholderMaize 
Productivity in Malawi: Toward an African Green Revolution. PLoS Biology 7(1): 2-10. 
Diao, X., P. Dorosh, et al. (2003). Market opportunities for African agriculture: an 
examination of demand-side constraints on agricultural growth. Washington DC, 
IFPRI. 
Dorward, A. R. and E. Chirwa (2011). Evaluation of the 2010/11 farm input subsidy 
programme, Malawi: report on programme implementation. London, School of Oriental 
and African Studies. 
21 
 
Dorward, A. R. and E. Chirwa (2010). A review of methods for estimating yield and 
production impacts. London, School of Oriental and African Studies. 
Dorward, A. (2011). Getting real about food prices. Development Policy Review. 
Dorward, A. R. and E. Chirwa (2010). A review of methods for estimating yield and 
production impacts. London, School of Oriental and African Studies. 
Dorward, A. R. and E. Chirwa (2011). The Malawi Agricultural Input Subsidy Programme: 
2005-6 to 2008-9  International Journal of Agricultural Sustainability 9(1): 232–247. 
Dorward, A. R., E. Chirwa, et al. (2010). Evaluation of the 2008/9 agricultural input subsidy 
Malawi: Report on Programme Impact London, School of Oriental African Studies 
(SOAS). 
Dorward, A. R., N. D. Poole, et al. (2003). Markets, Institutions and Technology: Missing 
Links In Livelihoods Analysis. Development Policy Review 21(3): 319--332. 
Fan, S., A. Gulati, et al. (2007). Investment, Subsidies, and Pro-Poor Growth in Rural India. 
IFPRI Discussion Paper 716. Washington D.C., IFPRI. 
Fan, S., S. Thorat, et al. (2003). Investment, Subsidies, and Pro-poor Growth in Rural India,. 
Draft report, Institutions and Economic Policies for Pro-Poor Agricultural Growth,, 
IFPRI. 
Haggblade, S., P. Hazell, et al. (2007). Sectoral Growth Linkages between Agriculture and 
the Rural Non-farm Economy. In Transforming the Rural Non-farm Economy. S. 
Haggblade, P. Hazell and T. Reardon. Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press. 
Holden, S. and R. Lunduka (2010). Too Poor to be Efficient? Impacts of the targeted fertilizer 
subsidy program in Malawi on farm plot level input use, crop choice and land 
productivity. Ås, Norway, Department of Economics and Resource Management, 
Norwegian University of Life Sciences. 
Pohl, G. and D. Mihaljek (1992). Project Evaluation and Uncertainty in Practice: A Statistical 
Analysis of Rate-of-Return Divergences of 1,015 World Bank Projects. World Bank 
Economic Review 6: 255-277. 
Sadoulet, E. and A. de Janvry (1995). Quantitative Development Policy Analysis. Baltimore, 
John Hopkins University Press. 
School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), Wadonda Consult, et al. (2008). Evaluation 
of the 2006/7 Agricultural  Input Supply Programme, Malawi: Final Report. London, 
School of Oriental and African Studies; March 2008. 
Timmer, C. P. (1989). Indonesia: transition from food importer to food exporter. In Food price 
policy in Asia. T. Sicular. Ithaca, Cornell University Press: 22-64. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
22 
 
 
Annex table A1 Sensitivity of BCA to higher and lower yields and higher displacement 
Year ED P P* PM PX Base scenario Yield increase 20% Diversion increase 25% 
      
  
  NB BCR FE P* NB BCR FE P* NB BCR FE 
    US$/kg US$ mill 
  
US$/kg US$ mill 
  
US$/kg US$ mill 
 
  
2005/6  0.51 0.24 0.14 0.29 0.14 42.2 1.58 1.16 0.12 62.5 1.86 1.72 0.15 34.3 1.61 0.94 
  Original mean= 0.14 N/A N/A 8.7 1.12 0.24 0.14 23.8 1.32 0.66 0.14 4.7 1.08 0.13 
2006/7  0.51 0.25 0.13 0.32 0.17 47.1 1.48 0.64 0.12 74.0 1.75 1.00 0.15 34.0 1.45 0.46 
  Original mean= 0.15 N/A N/A 6.0 1.06 0.08 0.15 25.5 1.26 0.35 0.15 2.1 1.03 0.03 
2007/8  0.51 1.83 0.35 0.30 0.15 113.1 1.86 1.19 0.29 161.4 2.21 1.69 0.48 81.5 1.80 0.85 
  Original mean= 0.25 N/A N/A 69.5 1.53 0.73 0.25 108.4 1.81 1.14 0.25 48.8 1.48 0.51 
2008/9 0.51 1.27 0.26 0.28 0.13 -39.0 0.87 -0.16 0.21 5.1 1.02 0.02 0.34 -37.0 0.84 -0.15 
  Original mean= 0.28 N/A N/A -40.2 0.87 -0.16 0.28 9.9 1.03 0.04 0.28 -37.7 0.84 -0.15 
2009/10 0.51 0.67 0.22 0.28 0.13 47.9 1.27 0.34 0.18 80.5 1.45 0.57 0.27 36.9 1.27 0.26 
  Original mean= 0.26 N/A N/A 35.4 1.20 0.25 0.26 75.8 1.43 0.54 0.26 22.2 1.16 0.16 
2010/11 0.51 0.86 0.19 0.35 0.20 144.3 1.76 0.99 0.16 200.8 2.05 1.38 0.26 120.1 1.81 0.83 
  Original mean= 0.27 N/A N/A 95.7 1.50 0.66 0.27 151.0 1.79 1.04 0.27 67.0 1.45 0.46 
See notes on earlier tables.  
